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Permanently exiting poverty all together? Evaluating the sustainability of the collective-level impacts of a basic income experiment in rural Uganda

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Introduction

- Discussions on CTs and Universal Basic Income (UBI) on the rise: also because of recurrent crises, such as COVID-19 (Gentilini et al., 2022)
- **Cash transfers** (CTs) often conceptualized as *short-term interventions* (Hadju et al., 2020)
  - *Assumption:* ***not adequate to build*** permanent and ***sustainable livelihoods*** (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2015) by themselves
- However, impact analyses disprove these hypotheses (Blattman et al., 2015; Hahn et al., 2018; Oliveira & Chagas, 2020)
- Despite their wide arrange of social, relational and collective effects, **most studies only focus on HH and individual-level** (Grisolia et al., 2021)

Relevance of the research

- Recent discussions do consider CTs' (Daidone et al., 2015; Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Molyneux et al., 2016) and UBI's (de Paz-Báñez et al., 2020; Gibson et al., 2018) potential to yield '**transformative**' and **long-lasting effects** and to protect against crises (Standing, 2020)
- Little is known about **sustainability** (i.e., persistence after program end; OECD, 2021) of (collective) CT impacts (Grisolia, 2023; Owusu-Addo et al., 2023)

→ ***Evaluating if CTs** (alone) are **effective** at generating **sustainable reductions in poverty and vulnerability*** (Hashemi & Umaira, 2011)

- **Poverty** is **not just** about **income**: social aspects (Rock et al., 2016)

The collective effects of CTs

- Collective-level outcomes: ***social capital, agency and collective action*** (Grisolia et al., 2021)
- **Social capital** *critical for sustainable development* and societal prosperity (Garbarino & Holland, 2009)
  - But alone *not sufficient* to spur **collective action** (Bodin & Crona, 2008)
  - Enhancements in (influential actors') **agency** also *necessary* (Krishna, 2002)



Collective-level outcomes: social capital

- **Social capital** is a *multidimensional* concept, *society-specific and subject to changes over time* (Narayan and Cassidy, 1999; Woolcook and Narayan, 2000)
- Coherently, numerous definitions (and assessment tools) of social capital have been produced: we chose the World Bank SOCAT (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002)

Dimension	Main indicators
Structural social capital (groups and networks)	• Membership in organizations, networks or associations (present and past) • Expectations regarding networks and mutual support • Organizational density and characteristics • Diversity and inclusion patterns of the groups • Previous collective action*
Cognitive social capital (trust and solidarity)	• Degree to which determined categories (ethnic, professional, etc.) can be trusted (present and past) • Solidarity patterns (frequency, willingness to contribute, etc.) inside the community • Conflict and conflict resolution*

Collective-level outcomes: agency and collective action

AGENCY

- In social sciences, the *capacity of individuals to act independently* and to make their own free choices (Tan, 2011)
- *Elusive and vague* nature in academic debates
- Most definitions capture the idea of **perceived self-efficacy** (Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Harvey, 2002)

COLLECTIVE ACTION

- Often used as a synonym of social structures or formal organizations (German et al., 2006)
- Most literature *does not even define it* (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004)
- This research focuses on its economic perspective, where collective action is ultimately viewed as the creation of ***public goods and bads*** (Olson, 1965)

The sustainability of (collective) impacts

- OECD DAC defines **sustainability** as "*the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue or are likely to continue*" (OECD, 2021, p. 71)
- Close link **collective outcomes-sustainability** (Hajdu et al., 2020)
  - Relationship *deprivation-social aspects* (Devereux & McGregor, 2014)
  - **Social capital-agency interplay** crucial in generating **collective action**
    - ultimately the **public goods** needed
      - to ***sustainably lift recipients out of poverty*** (Bodin & Crona, 2008)
- Evidence scarce, but tends to support argument (Grisolia, 2023)

Data and empirical strategy

Setting and data collection

- **Universal unconditional** mobile cash transfer (UCT) → UBI pilot
- Western rural **Ugandan village** Busibi + control
- Data collected *at three different points in time*
  - one year into the program (***midline***; January 2018)
  - just after the end of it (***endline***; January 2019)
  - two years after the finalization of the CT (***follow-up***; January 2021)

Data and empirical strategy

Data analysis and synthesis

- *Quasi-experimental matching techniques*: **Coarsened Exact Matching** (CEM; Iacus et al., 2012) and **Mahalanobis Distance Matching** (MDM; King et al., 2011)
- Operationalization *on the basis of existing empirical literature*:

Outcomes (and components)		Main adopted indicators
Social capital	Structural	Membership in organizations, crime and antisocial behaviour, social networks
	Cognitive	Interpersonal and institutional trust
Agency		Life satisfaction, individual demand for services
Collective action		Collective demand for services, collective investment

Data and empirical strategy

Research questions and hypotheses

- **RQ**: *Did Busibi's CT (UBI) yield any collective effects?*
  - *If so, did they persist after the end of the program?*

Outcome and indicators	Effect direction	Sustainability
Social capital		
Structural social capital	+	Yes
Cognitive social capital	+	
Agency	+	
Collective action	+/-	

Results: *Structural social capital*

Matching

- **Membership in organizations**: overall, positive and sustained
  - Driven by women (larger CT amounts; Yoong et al., 2012)
- **Crime**: *sustained reductions measured via comparisons*
- **Social networks**: (as expected; Bastagli et al., 2016), long-run positive effects
  - Larger for women: enhanced agency and risk-sharing?

Variable [range]	Midline§ MDM	Midline§ CEM	Endline MDM	Endline CEM	Follow-up MDM	Follow-up CEM
Membership in organizations						
Community-based organizations [1,4]	0.241* (0.235) [124]	0.133 (0.149) [84]	0.327** (0.159) [104]	0.101 (0.099) [61]	0.192** (0.087) [104]	0.008 (0.086) [84]
Saving and loan groups (SACCOs) [1,4]	0.963*** (0.227) [124]	0.812*** (0.240) [83]	0.714*** (0.256) [105]	0.273 (0.254) [61]	0.451* (0.262) [105]	0.399* (0.230) [85]
Water user committees [1,4]	-0.038 (0.141) [118]	0.125 (0.100) [77]	0.022 (0.022) [100]	0.000 (0.000) [58]	0.043 (0.043) [100]	-0.011 (0.012) [76]
Faith-based organizations [1,4]	0.036 (0.248) [123]	-0.230 (0.246) [83]	0.261 (0.285) [102]	-0.093 (0.452) [60]	0.212 (0.285) [106]	0.035 (0.220) [85]
Non-Governmental Organizations [1,4]	0.431*** (0.120) [118]	0.583*** (0.177) [82]	0.245** (0.095) [105]	0.269** (0.130) [61]	0.157*** (0.059) [98]	0.161 (0.099) [79]
Other civil society organizations [1,4]	0.038 (0.039) [119]	-0.017 (0.017) [80]	0.082* (0.049) [105]	0.000 (0.000) [61]	-0.085 (0.161) [94]	-0.052 (0.069) [78]
Total membership in organizations' score [0,6]	1.618*** (0.584) [126]	1.413** (0.590) [84]	1.340** (0.592) [107]	0.737 (0.755) [62]	1.192** (0.551) [107]	0.905* (0.459) [87]
Crime and antisocial behaviour						
Frequency of property crimes faced by the HH during the past year [1,5]	-0.109 (0.163) [126]	-0.110 (0.128) [84]	0.000 (0.306) [105]	-0.360 (0.317) [61]	0.250 (0.261) [105]	0.591*** (0.209) [86]
Comparison with just before program start [-1,1]	-0.673*** (0.164) [123]	-0.588*** (0.177) [81]	-0.388* (0.214) [104]	-0.397* (0.218) [60]	-0.190 (0.194) [79]	-0.311* (0.164) [61]
Frequency of violent crimes faced by the HH during the past year [1,5]	-0.111 (0.124) [123]	0.018 (0.109) [83]	0.000 (0.146) [104]	0.031 (0.148) [61]	-0.154 (0.221) [104]	0.228 (0.201) [84]
Comparison with just before program start [-1,1]	-0.618*** (0.178) [125]	-0.810*** (0.167) [83]	-0.286 (0.205) [105]	-0.262 (0.224) [61]	-0.314* (0.166) [97]	-0.357*** (0.130) [78]
Social networks						
Size of social support network [0+]	-0.291 (0.389) [126]	-0.130 (0.288) [84]	0.220 (0.369) [107]	0.596 (0.370) [62]	0.500** (0.232) [107]	0.469** (0.235) [87]
Size of financial support network [0+]	-0.109 (0.246) [126]	-0.185 (0.228) [84]	0.060 (0.169) [107]	0.096 (0.167) [62]	0.577*** (0.141) [107]	0.585*** (0.196) [87]
Size of call-to-action network [0+]	0.600** (0.288) [126]	0.470* (0.250) [84]	0.320* (0.193) [107]	0.417* (0.241) [62]	0.365*** (0.125) [107]	0.464*** (0.120) [87]

Results: *Cognitive social capital*

Matching

Variable [range]	Midline		Endline		Follow-up	
	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Trust: preferred criteria for targeting of hypothetical CT [0,1]						
Villagers together	0.055 (0.090) [126]	0.060 (0.074) [84]	-0.271** (0.128) [105]	-0.321** (0.141) [60]	-0.231* (0.121) [107]	-0.295*** (0.111) [87]
Local Governments (LGs)	-0.182* (0.102) [126]	-0.140* (0.075) [84]	-0.063 (0.085) [105]	-0.025 (0.074) [60]	-0.231*** (0.088) [107]	-0.159*** (0.056) [87]
Objective indicator	-0.200 (0.124) [126]	-0.206* (0.120) [84]	0.125 (0.131) [105]	-0.007 (0.134) [60]	-0.096 (0.118) [107]	-0.123 (0.108) [87]
Randomly	0.018 (0.018) [126]	0.000 (0.000) [84]	0.000 (0.058) [105]	-0.163 (0.139) [60]	-0.096* (0.055) [107]	-0.076** (0.032) [87]
Certain categories	-0.127 (0.088) [126]	-0.184** (0.082) [84]	-0.146 (0.132) [105]	-0.150 (0.150) [60]	-0.308*** (0.104) [107]	-0.224** (0.093) [87]
Informal leaders	0.073** (0.035) [126]	0.022 (0.035) [84]	0.042 (0.083) [105]	0.068 (0.078) [60]	-0.442*** (0.109) [107]	-0.437*** (0.089) [87]
None (universal CT)	0.400*** (0.102) [126]	0.427*** (0.110) [84]	-0.063 (0.101) [105]	0.030 (0.116) [60]	0.115 (0.118) [107]	0.276*** (0.105) [87]

- **Trust**: hypothetical question on preferred targeting method
  - Sustained *negative impacts on trust in others and in institutions*?
  - Rather persistent **reluctance to accept any other than universal** CTs (Kidd et al., 2020)

Results: *Agency*

Matching

- **Life satisfaction**: largest, most positive and best sustained effects
  - Only significant for *women in long-run*
- **(Individual) demand for services**: overall *positive*, at least in long-run
  - Not on contacting duty bearers: see Grisolia et al., 2023
  - Impacts on attending meetings and raising issues driven by women

Variable [range]	Midline		Endline		Follow-up	
	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Life satisfaction						
Current life satisfaction [1,10]	1.945*** (0.510) [124]	1.996*** (0.444) [83]	1.375*** (0.503) [105]	1.378** (0.643) [60]	1.423** (0.619) [107]	0.831* (0.472) [87]
Comparison with just before program start [-1,1]	0.519*** (0.152) [116]	0.549*** (0.191) [77]	0.333* (0.192) [105]	0.260 (0.182) [60]	1.058*** (0.150) [107]	0.956*** (0.140) [87]
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.451** (0.179) [105]	0.316* (0.176) [85]
Demand for services' frequency						
Attending a community meeting [1,7]	0.164 (0.333) [125]	0.236 (0.254) [83]	0.958*** (0.276) [105]	0.333 (0.312) [59]	0.692** (0.332) [104]	0.786*** (0.290) [84]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.377*** (0.112) [123]	0.402*** (0.129) [82]	0.064 (0.127) [104]	0.123 (0.119) [59]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.000 (0.098) [101]	-0.018 (0.088) [85]
Actively raising an issue at a community meeting [1,7]	0.250 (0.330) [122]	0.478* (0.283) [83]	0.813*** (0.310) [105]	0.148 (0.327) [60]	0.808*** (0.309) [105]	0.818*** (0.291) [86]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.370*** (0.121) [115]	0.388*** (0.132) [76]	0.021 (0.118) [104]	0.015 (0.122) [60]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.000 (0.101) [100]	-0.015 (0.089) [84]
Contacting service delivery to complain about their services [1,7]	0.176 (0.286) [122]	-0.006 (0.270) [82]	0.553** (0.273) [104]	0.365* (0.207) [59]	0.440*** (0.153) [101]	0.161 (0.108) [85]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.109 (0.097) [116]	0.162 (0.119) [76]	0.087 (0.085) [103]	0.022 (0.097) [59]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.063 (0.078) [99]	0.044 (0.074) [82]
Contacting local duty bearers to complain about their services [1,7]	0.020 (0.345) [121]	-0.033 (0.144) [80]	0.511** (0.255) [104]	0.257 (0.169) [59]	-0.551 (0.493) [102]	-0.707** (0.338) [83]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.042 (0.095) [116]	0.003 (0.111) [76]	0.000 (0.080) [103]	0.000 (0.088) [58]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.043 (0.095) [99]	0.026 (0.091) [81]

Results: *Collective action*

Matching

Variable [range]	Midline		Endline		Follow-up	
	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Collective investment						
HH investment in collective projects [1,6]	0.245 (0.185) [123]	0.313 (0.274) [82]	-0.063 (0.233) [105]	-0.058 (0.108) [60]	0.137 (0.084) [103]	-0.031 (0.031) [85]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.094 (0.079) [123]	0.057 (0.110) [82]	0.063 (0.063) [105]	0.000 (0.058) [60]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start+ [-1,1]					-0.043 (0.066) [95]	-0.032 (0.056) [81]
Demand for services' frequency						
Getting together with others to raise an issue [1,7]	0.241 (0.350) [124]	0.325 (0.246) [82]	0.521* (0.284) [104]	0.405 (0.326) [59]	0.827** (0.320) [105]	0.747** (0.293) [85]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.327*** (0.100) [123]	0.291** (0.146) [82]	0.021 (0.122) [104]	0.035 (0.130) [60]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start+ [-1,1]					-0.020 (0.116) [99]	-0.008 (0.089) [83]

- **Collective investment**: insignificant at all stages
  - Initially positive for men, but did not persist beyond midline
- **(Collective) demand for services**: overall *positive*, robust effects at follow-up
  - More robust for women

Conclusions and implications for further research (1)

- *Main finding*: *dismissal of assumption that CTs (alone) cannot yield long-lasting effects* (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2015; Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2013)
  - **CTs can have sustained/long-term impacts** on ***collective outcomes*** such as social networks, life satisfaction and collective demand for services
- UBI receivers were sustainably ***reluctant to accept targeted CTs*** (Kidd et al., 2020)
  - **Universality** could have actually *driven some observed effects* (no resentment/jealousy)
  - → '***Transformative***' impacts (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004): individuals relying on strong social networks are *less vulnerable to shocks* (Bastagli et al., 2016)
- **Collective action** activated: but additional qualitative evidence needed

→ **Basic income can have sustained collective impacts** (even in times of crisis)

Conclusions and implications for further research (2)

- **RQ**: *Did Busibi's CT (UBI) yield any collective effects?*
  - *If so, did they persist after the end of the program?*

Outcome and indicators	Effect direction	Sustainability
Social capital		
Structural social capital	+	Yes
Cognitive social capital	Actually -	Actually sustained
Agency	+	Not consistently
Collective action	+/-	Not consistently

Conclusions and implications for further research (3)

- Implementing organizations should take the ***transformative potential of CTs (and UBI)*** into account, when designing them
  - When **upscaling** programs, such impacts could reach the **aggregate macro-level**, and enhance ***social inclusion***, ***social cohesion***, and the ***social contract*** (Babajanian, 2012; Bastagli et al., 2016; Drucza, 2016)
- Nevertheless, further research necessary (Grisolia, 2023; Owusu-Addo et al., 2023)

Limitations

- **Lack of baseline data**: only cross-sectional quasi-experimental matching viable

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

Any questions?

Results: Structural social capital

by gender

	Women						Men					
	Midline§		Endline		Follow-up		Midline§		Endline		Follow-up	
Variable [range]	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Membership in organizations												
Community-based organizations [1,4]	0.034 (0.178) [72]	0.143 (0.188) [56]	0.160 (0.149) [58]	0.105 (0.105) [42]	0.000 (0.000) [58]	-0.011 (0.012) [57]	0.480** (0.184) [52]	0.045 (0.227) [27]	0.500* (0.286) [46]	0.143 (0.136) [29]	0.417** (0.180) [46]	0.117 (0.217) [39]
Saving and loan groups (SACCOs) [1,4]	1.172*** (0.272) [72]	1.090*** (0.284) [55]	0.760** (0.302) [58]	0.351 (0.340) [42]	0.593* (0.299) [58]	0.294 (0.283) [58]	0.680* (0.375) [52]	0.168 (0.376) [27]	0.250 (0.353) [47]	0.107 (0.332) [29]	-0.083 (0.416) [47]	0.079 (0.349) [40]
Water user committees [1,4]	0.000 (0.000) [70]	0.000 (0.000) [53]	-0.042 (0.137) [56]	-0.036 (0.038) [41]	0.000 (0.000) [56]	0.000 (0.000) [55]	-0.250 (0.322) [48]	0.319 (0.277) [23]	0.000 (0.000) [44]	0.000 (0.000) [27]	0.100 (0.100) [36]	-0.028 (0.029) [34]
Faith-based organizations [1,4]	0.034 (0.337) [70]	-0.061 (0.307) [55]	0.080 (0.377) [58]	-0.012 (0.508) [42]	0.500 (0.342) [59]	-0.013 (0.295) [58]	-0.346 (0.446) [53]	-0.644 (0.417) [27]	0.381 (0.441) [44]	0.110 (0.367) [28]	-0.250 (0.456) [47]	0.031 (0.400) [41]
Non-Governmental Organizations [1,4]	0.321* (0.163) [68]	0.429** (0.212) [54]	0.320** (0.138) [58]	0.421** (0.176) [42]	0.185* (0.093) [56]	0.098 (0.120) [55]	0.565*** (0.176) [50]	0.750*** (0.270) [27]	0.167 (0.130) [47]	0.000 (0.000) [29]	0.125* (0.069) [42]	0.125 (0.085) [37]
Other civil society organizations [1,4]	0.000 (0.000) [68]	0.000 (0.000) [53]	0.000 (0.000) [58]	0.000 (0.000) [42]	0.000 (0.000) [53]	0.000 (0.000) [52]	0.080 (0.080) [51]	-0.071 (0.072) [26]	0.167* (0.098) [47]	0.071 (0.071) [29]	-0.182 (0.349) [41]	-0.407 (0.302) [38]
Total membership in organizations' score [0,6]	1.552** (0.644) [73]	1.611** (0.703) [56]	1.240* (0.753) [59]	1.043 (0.900) [43]	1.464** (0.659) [60]	0.844 (0.659) [60]	0.923 (0.877) [53]	0.659 (1.056) [27]	0.720 (0.914) [48]	0.321 (0.614) [29]	0.625 (0.842) [47]	0.542 (0.798) [41]
Crime and antisocial behaviour												
Frequency of property crimes faced by the HH during the past year [1,5]	-0.034 (0.184) [73]	-0.117 (0.128) [56]	0.120 (0.339) [58]	-0.125 (0.394) [42]	0.286 (0.355) [59]	0.731*** (0.237) [59]	-0.192 (0.280) [53]	-0.065 (0.259) [27]	-0.125 (0.501) [47]	-0.286 (0.407) [29]	0.458 (0.350) [46]	0.583* (0.302) [41]
Comparison with just before program start [-1,1]	-0.519** (0.228) [71]	-0.736*** (0.185) [54]	-0.480* (0.260) [58]	-0.217 (0.224) [42]	-0.174 (0.263) [46]	-0.138 (0.184) [41]	-0.640*** (0.222) [52]	-0.520* (0.286) [26]	-0.167 (0.346) [46]	-0.455* (0.248) [28]	-0.211 (0.229) [33]	-0.251 (0.223) [29]
Frequency of violent crimes faced by the HH during the past year [1,5]	0.000 (0.166) [72]	0.099 (0.123) [56]	-0.040 (0.217) [58]	0.136 (0.152) [42]	0.036 (0.285) [58]	0.383 (0.236) [57]	-0.280 (0.199) [51]	-0.133 (0.189) [26]	0.130* (0.072) [46]	0.071 (0.184) [29]	-0.208 (0.310) [46]	-0.073 (0.236) [41]
Comparison with just before program start [-1,1]	-0.517** (0.242) [73]	-0.913*** (0.191) [56]	-0.320 (0.257) [58]	-0.148 (0.235) [42]	-0.370 (0.226) [56]	-0.276* (0.139) [55]	-0.577** (0.261) [52]	-0.844*** (0.281) [26]	-0.333 (0.317) [47]	-0.321 (0.253) [29]	-0.292 (0.174) [41]	-0.353* (0.175) [37]
Social networks												
Size of social support network [0+]	-0.276 (0.357) [73]	-0.214 (0.308) [56]	0.280 (0.433) [59]	0.596 (0.425) [43]	0.036 (0.329) [60]	0.415* (0.249) [60]	-0.346 (0.593) [53]	0.430* (0.486) [27]	-0.160 (0.574) [48]	0.786* (0.455) [29]	1.000*** (0.336) [47]	0.833** (0.360) [41]
Size of financial support network [0+]	-0.310 (0.302) [73]	-0.379 (0.308) [56]	0.320** (0.132) [59]	0.307** (0.130) [43]	0.571*** (0.194) [60]	0.619*** (0.225) [60]	0.385 (0.385) [53]	0.500 (0.318) [27]	-0.320 (0.321) [48]	-0.321 (0.275) [29]	0.500** (0.203) [47]	0.521** (0.252) [41]
Size of call-to-action network [0+]	0.207 (0.296) [73]	0.412 (0.313) [56]	0.560** (0.234) [59]	0.675** (0.290) [43]	0.357** (0.143) [60]	0.528*** (0.135) [60]	1.000* (0.513) [53]	0.820** (0.384) [27]	0.000 (0.355) [48]	0.143 (0.249) [29]	0.458** (0.226) [47]	0.375* (0.196) [41]

Results: Cognitive social capital

by gender

	Women						Men					
	Midline		Endline		Follow-up		Midline		Endline		Follow-up	
Variable [range]	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Trust: preferred criteria for targeting of hypothetical CT [0,1]												
Villagers together	0.034 (0.129) [73]	0.124 (0.095) [56]	-0.080 (0.175) [59]	-0.169 (0.174) [42]	-0.179 (0.164) [60]	-0.366*** (0.133) [60]	0.115* (0.064) [53]	0.055 (0.098) [27]	-0.478*** (0.176) [46]	-0.478** (0.174) [28]	-0.375** (0.158) [47]	-0.479*** (0.148) [41]
Local Governments (LGs)	-0.241* (0.125) [73]	-0.187** (0.079) [56]	0.040 (0.119) [59]	0.051 (0.082) [42]	-0.179* (0.102) [60]	-0.157* (0.082) [60]	-0.154 (0.169) [53]	-0.052 (0.166) [27]	-0.174 (0.154) [46]	-0.214* (0.119) [28]	-0.167 (0.155) [47]	-0.271** (0.110) [41]
Objective indicator	-0.103 (0.150) [73]	-0.206 (0.145) [56]	0.280* (0.166) [59]	0.134 (0.153) [42]	0.036 (0.141) [60]	-0.011 (0.136) [60]	-0.423** (0.188) [53]	-0.324 (0.194) [27]	0.000 (0.212) [46]	-0.223 (0.202) [28]	-0.417** (0.184) [47]	-0.385** (0.150) [41]
Randomly	0.000 (0.000) [73]	0.000 (0.000) [56]	-0.120 (0.079) [59]	-0.146 (0.153) [42]	-0.071 (0.063) [60]	-0.047 (0.030) [60]	0.038 (0.038) [53]	0.091 (0.090) [27]	0.130* (0.072) [46]	-0.036 (0.037) [28]	0.000 (0.099) [47]	-0.063 (0.094) [41]
Certain categories	-0.138 (0.097) [73]	-0.156* (0.078) [56]	-0.160 (0.173) [59]	-0.090 (0.180) [42]	-0.393*** (0.143) [60]	-0.209* (0.188) [60]	-0.038 (0.128) [53]	-0.105 (0.078) [27]	-0.087 (0.211) [46]	-0.412** (0.184) [28]	-0.292* (0.161) [47]	-0.271** (0.126) [41]
Informal leaders	0.103* (0.058) [73]	0.027 (0.052) [56]	0.000 (0.108) [59]	0.087 (0.075) [42]	-0.357*** (0.134) [60]	-0.449*** (0.111) [60]	0.038 (0.038) [53]	0.000 (0.000) [27]	0.043 (0.128) [46]	0.041 (0.085) [28]	-0.625*** (0.161) [47]	-0.656*** (0.104) [41]
None (universal CT)	0.414*** (0.140) [73]	0.392*** (0.148) [56]	-0.240 (0.147) [59]	-0.220 (0.164) [42]	0.214 (0.161) [60]	0.346*** (0.125) [60]	0.385*** (0.134) [53]	0.285 (0.179) [27]	0.174** (0.081) [46]	0.313* (0.158) [28]	0.125 (0.158) [47]	0.229 (0.148) [41]

Results:
Agency
by gender

	Women						Men					
	Midline		Endline		Follow-up		Midline		Endline		Follow-up	
Variable [range]	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Life satisfaction												
Current life satisfaction [1,10]	1.586** (0.659) [72]	1.664*** (0.551) [55]	0.560 (0.522) [59]	0.756 (0.583) [42]	2.143*** (0.803) [60]	0.997* (0.555) [60]	2.077** (0.790) [52]	2.130*** (0.715) [27]	2.391*** (0.871) [46]	1.777* (0.884) [28]	0.375 (0.944) [47]	0.313 (0.738) [41]
Comparison with just before program start [-1,1]	0.724*** (0.179) [68]	0.491** (0.225) [52]	0.160 (0.236) [59]	0.264 (0.198) [42]	1.143*** (0.165) [60]	0.897*** (0.186) [60]	0.280 (0.240) [48]	0.539** (0.261) [25]	0.478 (0.330) [46]	0.401 (0.345) [28]	0.792*** (0.236) [47]	0.552** (0.246) [41]
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.630*** (0.234) [59]	0.393* (0.223) [58]					0.292 (0.247) [46]	0.281 (0.218) [41]
Demand for services' frequency												
Attending a community meeting [1,7]	0.345 (0.321) [72]	0.382 (0.323) [55]	0.458 (0.334) [58]	0.102 (0.352) [40]	0.786* (0.428) [58]	0.970*** (0.322) [57]	-0.115 (0.507) [53]	-0.294 (0.431) [27]	1.292*** (0.404) [47]	0.893** (0.397) [29]	0.875* (0.509) [46]	0.604 (0.446) [41]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.481*** (0.142) [70]	0.405** (0.168) [54]	0.083 (0.152) [58]	0.150 (0.136) [41]			0.308* (0.174) [53]	0.206 (0.194) [27]	0.043 (0.242) [46]	0.426** (0.182) [28]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.000 (0.134) [59]	-0.080 (0.110) [59]					0.000 (0.153) [42]	-0.042 (0.074) [40]
Actively raising an issue at a community meeting [1,7]	0.429 (0.390) [71]	0.690* (0.361) [55]	0.542 (0.356) [58]	0.350 (0.380) [41]	0.786* (0.434) [59]	0.895*** (0.330) [59]	-0.208 (0.515) [51]	-0.412 (0.419) [27]	1.000** (0.456) [47]	0.321 (0.449) [29]	1.042** (0.443) [46]	0.896** (0.419) [41]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.400*** (0.140) [67]	0.348** (0.157) [51]	0.042 (0.126) [58]	0.048 (0.118) [41]			0.333 (0.203) [48]	0.229 (0.260) [24]	-0.043 (0.208) [46]	0.349 (0.212) [28]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.000 (0.134) [59]	-0.080 (0.110) [59]					-0.050 (0.165) [41]	-0.042 (0.074) [39]
Contacting service delivery to complain about their services [1,7]	-0.192 (0.372) [70]	-0.006 (0.320) [54]	0.521* (0.276) [57]	0.539** (0.275) [40]	0.519*** (0.163) [57]	0.288** (0.139) [59]	0.480 (0.421) [52]	0.191 (0.360) [27]	0.708 (0.461) [47]	0.286 (0.269) [29]	0.391 (0.264) [44]	0.100 (0.203) [40]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.250** (0.101) [67]	0.267** (0.105) [52]	0.000 (0.108) [57]	0.059 (0.104) [40]			0.045 (0.169) [49]	-0.179 (0.256) [23]	0.174 (0.120) [46]	0.153 (0.153) [28]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.074 (0.098) [58]	-0.009 (0.078) [57]					0.095 (0.121) [41]	0.046 (0.109) [39]
Contacting local duty bearers to complain about their services [1,7]	-0.080 (0.166) [68]	-0.119 (0.175) [52]	0.043 (0.262) [57]	0.268 (0.212) [40]	0.107 (0.551) [58]	0.030 (0.314) [57]	0.346 (0.665) [53]	0.124 (0.323) [27]	0.958** (0.429) [47]	0..214 (0.246) [29]	-1.429* (0.773) [44]	-1.928*** (0.670) [39]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.000 (0.102) [66]	-0.031 (0.101) [51]	0.000 (0.108) [57]	0.059 (0.104) [40]			0.087 (0.157) [50]	0.043 (0.229) [24]	0.000 (0.109) [46]	-0.167 (0.112) [27]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start° [-1,1]					0.000 (0.121) [58]	-0.075 (0.104) [57]					0.100 (0.129) [41]	0.000 (0.121) [38]

Results: Collective action

by gender

	Women						Men					
	Midline		Endline		Follow-up		Midline		Endline		Follow-up	
Variable [range]	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM	MDM	CEM
Collective investment												
HH investment in collective projects [1,6]	-0.071 (0.272) [71]	0.194 (0.316) [54]	0.000 (0.000) [58]	0.000 (0.000) [41]	0.107 (0.107) [58]	0.000 (0.000) [58]	0.600*** (0.208) [52]	0.818*** (0.293) [27]	-0.125 (0.543) [47]	-0.286 (0.368) [29]	0.000 (0.236) [45]	-0.125 (0.189) [41]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.074 (0.102) [70]	0.024 (0.105) [54]	-0.083 (0.058) [58]	-0.111 (0.076) [41]			0.115 (0.115) [53]	0.091 (0.209) [27]	0.250** (0.122) [47]	0.071 (0.071) [29]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start• [-1,1]					-0.077 (0.098) [54]	-0.056 (0.074) [56]					0.000 (0.069) [41]	-0.071 (0.071) [38]
Demand for services' frequency												
Getting together with others to raise an issue [1,7]	0.464 (0.315) [71]	0.518 (0.312) [54]	0.417 (0.384) [57]	0.326 (0.407) [40]	0.714* (0.365) [59]	0.824*** (0.287) [58]	-0.077 (0.560) [53]	-0.194 (0.341) [27]	0.625 (0.407) [47]	0.464 (0.401) [29]	1.167** (0.575) [46]	0.583 (0.465) [41]
Comparison with just before program start° [-1,1]	0.346*** (0.121) [70]	0.241 (0.153) [54]	0.083 (0.144) [57]	0.122 (0.149) [41]			0.308* (0.155) [53]	0.455** (0.205) [27]	-0.042 (0.195) [47]	0.214 (0.207) [29]		
Comparison pre-COVID situation with just before program start• [-1,1]					0.000 (0.134) [58]	-0.045 (0.109) [57]					-0.048 (0.175) [41]	-0.089 (0.090) [39]

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